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Abstract—Empirical validations of research approaches even-
tually require a curated ground truth. In studies related to
Android malware, such a ground truth is built by leveraging
Anti-Virus (AV) scanning reports which are often provided free
through online services such as VirusTotal. Unfortunately, these
reports do not offer precise information for appropriately and
uniquely assigning classes to samples in app datasets: AV engines
indeed do not have a consensus on specifying information in
labels. Furthermore, labels often mix information related to
families, types, etc. In particular, the notion of “adware” is
currently blurry when it comes to maliciousness. There is thus a
need to thoroughly investigate cases where adware samples can
actually be associated with malware (e.g., because they are tagged
as adware but could be considered as malware as well).
In this work, we present a large-scale analytical study of
Android adware samples to quantify to what extent “adware
should be considered as malware”. Our analysis is based on
the Androzoo repository of 5 million apps with associated AV
labels and leverages a state-of-the-art label harmonization tool
to infer the malicious type of apps before confronting it against
the ad families that each adware app is associated with. We found
that all adware families include samples that are actually known
to implement specific malicious behavior types. Up to 50% of
samples in an ad family could be flagged as malicious. Overall
the study demonstrates that adware is not necessarily benign.
Index Terms—Android, adware, malware
I. INTRODUCTION
Adware is commonly known as “software that automatically
displays or downloads advertising material (often unwanted)
when a user is online”. [1]. Following this definition, the
threats to user security in adware behavior is hard to validate.
Indeed, advertisement (or ad in short) has become common,
particularly in mobile apps, and now constitutes the main
means for free app developers to collect revenue in compensa-
tion to their efforts. This situation has made adware a necessity
in the software development ecosystem and has thus delayed
the exhaustive coverage of adware by security firms for 15
years after adware debut [2]. Even until now, adware remains
a controversial issue: our community has still not agreed on
whether adware is malware or not. The recurrent question
during experimental assessments is “Should adware be taken
as malware?”.
MalGenome [3], a well-known Android malware dataset,
which is mainly built by manual efforts, does not contain
any adware. Qadri et al. [4] recently reported that researchers
do not generally classify adware as malware. Nevertheless,
they argue that adware, which has been flagged as such,
may not solely perform advertisements (i.e., adware may
also perform malicious behavior). Ishii et al. [5] in their
app clone study (i.e., identifying repackaged or piggybacked
Android apps) also distinguish adware and malware as from
two distinct categories. Finally, according to Symantec [6] and
other research works [7], [8], ad libraries may not only show
ads in their apps but also can leak personal data, send SMS,
etc.
These contradictory considerations suggest that our commu-
nity does not agree on a clear definition of adware scope. We
thus argue that there is a need in our community to clearly
define the relationship between adware and malware and
thereby to provide a comprehensible guideline for researchers
and practitioners to follow. To this end, we resort to address
this challenge in this work through a quantitative analytical
study on over five millions Android apps that are crawled from
various app markets, including the official one named Google
Play. By sending all five million apps to VirusTotal, a free
service leveraging various AV products to analyze suspicious
files and URLs and facilitate the quick detection of viruses,
worms, trojans, and all kinds of malware, we are able to
identify all the malicious apps and their AV labels, including
adware. We then leverage Euphony [9], a tool that unifies
multiple AV labels, to cluster flagged adware into different
families. Subsequently, we rank those adware families based
on their malicious rate, i.e., how many adware in a family
are also labeled as malicious, and present to the community a
quantitative model which can later be leveraged to advise the
malicious rates of given adware (e.g., given an adware appad,
within family F , the model can suggest that this adware app
has x% of chance to be a malware). Finally, by considering all
the investigated apps, we showcase to the community a global
relationship between adware and malware.
To summarize, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We have collected AV labels from VirusTotal for over five
million Android apps, for which we plan to share with
the research community to boost further studies.
• We have empirically conducted a type composition analy-
sis for 26 selected ad families to understand the malicious
status of ad families. Furthermore, we have proposed a
malware probability model to quantify the global rela-
tionship between adware and malware and consequently
provided a web service that leverages the proposed model
to advise whether a given adware should be considered
as malware.
To facilitate replication study, we make available our
dataset, along with the generated intermediate dataset as well
as our experimental results at
https://adwarevsmalware.github.io
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the necessary background information to allow
readers to better understand this work. Section III details
our quantitative study towards discerning malicious adware
with controlled confidence. We then enumerate the threats to
validity and discuss our closely related works in Section IV
and Section V respectively. Finally, Section VI concludes this
paper.
II. BACKGROUND
We now provide necessary background information to allow
readers to better understand the purpose, techniques and key
concerns of this work.
First, AVs use labeling to flag detected malicious apps
(including adware). As illustrated in Fig. 1, a label is a
sequence of words including information such as: type, family,
platform etc. Let us take the app shown in Fig. 1 as an
example, Emsisoft, an AV, labels the analyzed app as Back-
door.AndroidOS.KungFu!IK. From this label, we can pinpoint
the type of the app is Backdoor, the family is DroidKungFu,
the running platform is android etc.
Labels
Fig. 1. An Example of VirusTotal Result.
Second, as explained, a label contains information about the
type and the family of a flag malicious app. In this work, we
differentiate type and family through the following definitions.
• Type is a behavior-oriented classification, where apps
showing similar (malicious) behaviors are clustered into
a same type. For example, apps showing advertisements
could be categorized as adware while apps hijacking
user’s equipment for ransom can be taken as ransomware,
etc.
• Family presents a more fine-grained classification where
apps within one family should share some code patterns
reflecting why those apps are clustered together. As
examples, kuguo is a well-known family named after a
library called kuguo. Gingermaster is a family where all
the apps within this family target the same bug of Android
platform version gingerbread.
In practice, each app will be assigned with only one type
when an AV product label it (i.e., one AV product gives one
type). However, we cannot blindly rely on type information
to know if an adware is a “pure” adware or if this adware
also performs some malicious behaviour. We can mention at
least two reasons for this. First, the type given by an AV
product does not necessarily mean the app’s behavior will be
constrained by the type definition. Indeed, it is not because
an AV product gives the type adware to an app that this app
cannot also perform trojan behavior. Moreover, since an AV
product gives only one type, this type cannot represent all the
behavior of the labeled app. The second reason relies on the
fact that AV products are often inconsistent, i.e., AV products
can give completely different labels leading to various possible
types and families for a given app.
Therefore, in this work, we define two terms about adware
to make the concept clearer:
• Labeled adware: Given an app scanned by certain AVs,
it is tagged with an adware label by the AVs. However,
whether it can implement malicious behaviours is still in
doubt.
• Pure adware: Given an app, it is a pure adware when
(1) it is a labeled adware, and (2) the app does not
perform malicious behaviour. Hence, pure adware should
be accepted and be taken as non-malware.
Finally, since we are going to discuss the relationships
between adware and malware, in the following part, we will
distinguish adware from other malware types. So hereafter,
when we mention malware, adware is not included.
III. QUANTITATIVE STUDY
Our objective in this work is to provide a promising means
for researchers and practitioners to decide whether a given
adware should be considered as malware. To this end, we
present the experimental setup of this work (cf. Section III-A)
and two empirical studies related to adware and malware
(Section III-B and Section III-C). Finally, in Section III-D,
we present an implication of our approach that demonstrates
the actionable usage of this work.
A. Experimental Setup
We now briefly introduce the experimental setup of this
work, including the investigated Android apps, their types and
families.
Android apps. The investigated apps in this work are
collected from AndroZoo [10], [11], an Android application
dataset established for the research community. So far, the An-
droZoo dataset contains more than five million apps crawled
from 14 different markets, including the official Google Play.
By running several crawlers constantly, it can provide both
historical and up-to-date apps while keeping the growth of
the dataset. Download APIs are also available to the research
community in order to benefit other researchers by simplifying
sample collection.
App Labels. All the apps in the AndroZoo dataset have
been sent to VirusTotal [12], a portal to detect virus with more
than 50 AV products, periodically. Thanks to this step, we have
collected and maintained for every collected app a set of labels
(each AV product gives one label).
App Types and Families. Labels from different
AV products are usually inconsistent. For instance,
in Figure 1, the label given by Emsisoft is
Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu!IK, whereas the label given
by F-Secure is Adware:Android/AdWo.A. In order to infer
an unique type and an unique family for each app, we
leverage a research tool called Euphony. Euphony is a
state-of-the-art tool to unify AV labels in order to provide
a better ground-truth to malware research studies based on
labels.
B. Ad Family Study
In order to have a concrete understanding of how adware
should be considered, we now investigate the malicious status
of ad families. Thanks to Euphony, we have collected in
total 4,088 families, including malicious and advertisement-
focused ones. Based on several pre-defined ad libraries [13], by
using keyword searching, we eventually identify 26 ad families
in our dataset. For each family, we further conduct a type
composition analysis to highlight its representative app types.
The type composition analysis computes the composition rate
of each type for each family. More specifically, for a family
f1, the rate is computed by considering all the apps from this
family, and all their associated unique types given by Euphony.
Then, we count the number of occurrences of each type. For
a given type, the composition rate is finally computed as the
rate between the number of occurrences of this type and the
total number of occurrences of all the types. Let us consider a
family with an app X of type T1, an app Y of type T2, and
an app Z of type T1. The composition rate of T1 is 66.66%
(2/3), and the composition rate of T2 is 33.33% (1/3).
The intuition behind this type composition analysis is that
if all apps of a family have been labeled as type adware, the
rate for the type adware is 100% suggesting that apps of this
family are pure adware. On the contrary, if apps of a family
have been labeled with various types including adware and
malware types, the rate of the type adware will be low and it
could suggest that apps of this family may perform malicious
behaviors.
The results of the type composition analysis are summarized
in Table I, where the ad families are ranked based on their
statistic malicious rate. As shown in Table I, although all these
families are supposed to be ad families, they all have somehow
shown malicious behavior to some extent, where Trojan is
the most possible malware type for adware to be. Let us take
family wiyun as an example, over 50% of investigated samples
are labeled as malware. In other words, given an app labeled
adware from family wiyun, we can quantitatively suggest that
it still has 56% of chance to be malware. Similarly, for a
labeled adware from family adcolony, the possibility of being
malware of this adware is 2%.
Furthermore, considering the possibility of false alarms
from AVs, a confidence rate t can be set and therefore, our
study can be directly leveraged to flag labeled adware as
malware, or goodware (i.e., to answer the question “Is Adware
Malware?”). Given a family with a malicious rate higher than
t, all adware labeled apps of this family can then be safely
taken as malware, and the vice-versa.
TABLE I
AD FAMILY TYPE COMPOSITION (MALICIOUS RATE = 1−Adware),
WHICH CAN BE TAKEN AS A LOOKUP TABLE FOR QUICKLY FLAGGING
MALWARE.
Family LabeledAdware Labeled Malware Malicious
Trojan Other Types Rate
wiyun 44% 32% 24% 56%
feiwo 45% 40% 15% 55%
kuguo 73% 21% 6% 27%
wooboo 77% 21% 2% 23%
domob 79% 20% 1% 21%
senddroid 79% 17% 4% 21%
inmobiads 83% 14% 3% 17%
revmob 84% 15% 1% 16%
dowgin 85% 8% 7% 15%
applovin 87% 11% 2% 13%
caulyads 90% 9% 1% 10%
admobads 91% 7% 2% 9%
startapp 92% 7% 1% 8%
tapjoyads 92% 7% 1% 8%
wapsx 93% 5% 2% 7%
airpush 94% 5% 1% 6%
youmi 94% 5% 1% 6%
adwo 94% 5% 1% 6%
greystripeads 94% 5% 1% 6%
jumptapiads 95% 4% 1% 5%
adwhirlads 96% 3% 1% 4%
mobclixads 97% 2% 1% 3%
burstlyads 97% 2% 1% 3%
madhouseads 97% 2% 1% 3%
millennialmediaads 98% 1% 1% 2%
adcolony 98% 1% 1% 2%
C. Global Relationship between Adware and Malware
Based on Table I, if one of app labeled as adware was
found, we can tell the probability with which it will be a
malware. However, questions still remain such as “what if we
don’t know the family information or the family is not in the
table?”. In this section, we, therefore, discuss a more general
method, aiming at finding the global probability (based on all
the apps considered in this study) for a labeled adware to be a
malware. Given a user-defined (or controlled) confidence, this
global probability can then be leveraged to estimate an ideal
malicious rate that further provides a promising means to flag
adware as malware.
Let us now define the global probability via Formula 1.
P (malware|Labeled adware) (1)
Labeled adware can be obtained in our sample set by
checking anti-virus reported labels (or types). Since apps of
one family should share the same code patterns, given a family
with most of its apps labeled as adware, we should have
confidence to conclude that apps of this family are likely to
be pure adware. Based on this assumption, given an Adware
Confidence AC, all the apps of families fulfill Formula 2
should be considered as malware.
P (Labeled adware|family) < AC (2)
Now, we can transform Formula 1 to Formula 3 shown as
below (where f are the families from Formula 2):∑
apps∈f
P (apps|Labeled adware) (3)
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Fig. 2. Malware Probability of Labeled Adware.
Figure 2 illustrates the global relationship between labeled
adware and malware, where the X-axis presents the adware
confidence (AC) and the Y-axis shows the probability of being
malicious. When considering AC = 1, standing for the most
conservative situation, for which families need to contain apps
with no other types than adware to fulfill Formula 2. This
consideration leads to the worst situation that apps labeled
as adware are highly likely to be malware too (with the
probability of 99.83%). However, scenarios such as type mis-
labeling, individual behaviors etc. always happen in practice.
Situations of AC = 1 could mislead by these noises. So a
reasonable error margin should be considered when choosing
the value of AC. On the other hand, a turning point has been
noticed around AC = 0.8. After this point, malware prob-
ability increased dramatically. So whether the error margin
could be large as 20% is a crucial decision for practitioners
to consider.
D. Web Service
Based on the malware probability model, we then imple-
ment a web service that 1) regularly updates the model based
on the latest app set of AndroZoo; 2) takes a set of Android
labeled adware as input and then returns the condemnation
results indicating which adware should be considered as mal-
ware. We expect this web service to be used as a common
means in our community to condemn adware and thus to
present consistent, and hopefully more accurate, empirical
studies.
IV. THREATS TO VALIDITY
The threat to the validity of our study mainly lies in the
exhaustiveness of our dataset, which may not be representative
to the current app ecosystem. However, we have conducted our
study on so far the largest app set available in our community
in order to mitigate this threat.
Furthermore, the anti-virus labels yielded by VirusTotal may
not be perfect. There may be a possibility that a benign app is
mistakenly flagged as a malware while a non-adware is flagged
as an adware. Besides, since the anti-virus labels are harvested
at a certain time, we are not aware of any changes anti-virus
may yield. Nevertheless, in this work, we attempt to alleviate
this threat by conducting our study on a fairly large number of
apps. Therefore, the empirical findings presented in this work
will unlikely be impacted.
Finally, the adware and malware families used in this work
are categorized via Euphony. Hence, this work shares the same
threats to validates of that of Euphony. For example, at the mo-
ment, we do not take familial ties (i.e., some adware/malware
families may overlap) into consideration, which may result in
labeling errors.
V. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first one to
quantitatively investigate the relationship between adware and
malware in the Android research community. However, ad-
ware/malware analysis of Android apps has been explored
from several aspects [14], [15]. In this section, we highlight
some representative ones.
Similar to Euphony, which has been leveraged in this work
to infer adware/malware families, AVClass [16] is another tool
that can be leveraged to achieve the same purpose. Besides,
as mentioned by the authors, AVClass requires a ground-truth
list of known families to distinguish from generic tokens,
and relies on vendor-specific rules to remove vendor suffixes,
which however are not needed by Euphony.
Many state-of-the-art works have focused on identifying ad
libraries instead of highlighting Android adware [13], [17]–
[20]. For example, Li et al. [13] has revealed 240 ad libraries
through a heuristic-based approach. Nevertheless, although
the findings of those approaches, being a whitelist of ad
libraries, can be leveraged to detect Android adware. Indeed,
as empirically reported by Dong et al. [21], [22] recently, some
mobile apps even attempt to violate the behavioural policies
of ad libraries. Those devious apps attempt to entice app users
to click ads (unintentionally in most cases) so as to gain more
revenues. If a given Android app has leveraged an ad library
from the whitelist, we have reasons to believe that it is an
adware. Unfortunately, this approach will introduce a lot of
false negatives because on the one hand, the whitelist is not
thorough enough to cover all the available ad libraries while on
the other hand whitelist-based approaches also cannot address
the challenge of obfuscation where a library could be totally
renamed.
The authors of AdRisk [23] have demonstrated that ad li-
braries may expose security and privacy risks, or even perform
malicious behavior such as leaking personal user information.
For example, they show that ad libraries may execute untrusted
codes that are downloaded from internet sources. Even worse,
those untrusted codes could be fetched in an unsafe way, which
by itself has caused serious security risks. Demetriou et al. [24]
reveals that there are four major channels that are recurrently
leveraged by ad libraries to collect private user information.
To mitigate this, researchers also explore different ways to
prevent such information from being leaked [25], [26] while
delivering ad content.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have conducted a quantitative study on
the relationship between adware and malware. The output of
this study is a ranked list of ad families with probabilities
of being malicious. Each family has been assigned with a
malicious rate, showing the possibility of being a malware,
given a random adware from that family. Our study provides
a means for security analysts to decide whether a given adware
should be considered as malware. Finally, by considering
all the investigated apps and the global relationship between
adware and malware, we present to the community an off-the-
shelf web service that condemns automatically adware with a
controlled confidence.
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